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I. INTRODUCTION
The landmark decision of Buchanan v. Warley' has long de-
served greater attention from scholars. Decided during the so-called
Progressive Era, when segregationist attitudes were at full tide,
Buchanan combined judicial protection of individual property rights
with solicitude for racial minorities. Indeed, Buchanan represents
both the resolute defense of property owners' rights against regulation
and the most significant judicial victory for civil rights during the
early decades of the twentieth century.2
One can only speculate about the lack of scholarly interest in
Buchanan. Possibly, the dual nature of Buchanan has made it diffi-
cult for scholars to assess. Perhaps the property-centered focus of
Buchanan made the case awkward for post-New Deal liberals, who
are indifferent at best to the constitutional protection of property
rights. Clearly Buchanan does not fit neatly into post-New Deal
* Professor of Law and History, Vanderbilt University. I wish to thank Jon W. Bruce
and Nicholas Zeppos for their astute comments on this Essay.
1. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
2. For the background of Buchanan, see generally A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES
OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 119-26
(1996); LOREN MILLER, THE PETITIONERS: THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES AND THE NEGRO 246-51 (1996); Roger L. Rice, Residential Segregation by Law, 1910-
1917, 34 J. S. HIST. 179-99 (1968).
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jurisprudence, with its artificial and unhistorical division between the
rights of property owners and other individual liberties. Such factors
may have caused scholars to overlook or intentionally downplay
Buchanan.
II. ANALYSIS OF KLARMAN AND BERNSTEIN ARTICLES
These fine articles by Michael J. Klarman and David E.
Bernstein contribute to a better understanding of Buchanan v. Warley
and its important place in constitutional history. The pieces dovetail,
complementing each other and providing fresh perspectives on prop-
erty rights and race relations in early twentieth-century America.
A. Klarman
KIarman examines Buchanan in light of the general political
and intellectual currents of the Progressive Era.3 Theorizing that the
Supreme Court usually reflects contemporary values, he considers
how the justices could have decided Buchanan and three other cases
favorably to civil rights claimants despite pervasive racist attitudes
among the public. Klarman rightly concludes that the Court's dedica-
tion to property rights in Buchanan was consonant with a widely
shared belief about the importance of property ownership and a long
history of judicial activism in support of economic liberty.4 These
factors were conspicuously absent when racial segregation was raised
with respect to social issues, such as schooling and railroad travel. In
a sense, the fundamental value of property rights trumped popular
racist views implicit in residential segregation ordinances.
Klarman is disparaging about the impact of Buchanan, cor-
rectly noting that the ruling did not produce much change in patterns
of residential segregation. That criticism, however, strikes me as
3. Historians have debated the nature and goals of the loose-knit reform movement
before World War I known as Progressivism. See generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF
REFORM 131-214 (1955) (comparing rural nature of Populist movement with urban focus of
Progressive era); ARTHUR S. LINK, WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, 1910-1917, at
1-80 (1954) (comparing New Nationalism with New Freedom and linking New Freedom to
Progressivism); ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920, at 164-95 (1967)
(discussing the arrival of Progressivism). A critical assessment of Progressivism is provided in
ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT 106-22 (1987) (questioning efficacy of Progressive confidence in experts and the
drive to enlarge governmental authority).
4. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (2d ed. 1998) (tracing origin and development of interest in
property rights through distinct eras in American history).
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wide of the mark. No decision by the Supreme Court could undo the
host of legal devices and informal arrangements that sustained racial
segregation in housing. Indeed, by Klarman's standard, many ac-
claimed civil rights decisions could be dismissed as ineffective. For
example, Shelly v. Kraemer, which voided racially restrictive cove-
nants in deeds,5 did little to overcome racial discrimination in hous-
ing. Even the Fair Housing Act of 1968 has proven unable to stem
discriminatory practices or to achieve meaningful integration of
predominantly white neighborhoods. 6 Courts and legislators can only
do so much to bring about social change.
7
Despite that reality, I contend, in contrast to KIarman, that
Buchanan had both practical and symbolic significance. First, the
Supreme Court made clear that there was a limit to legislation impos-
ing racial segregation. Majority preferences could not extinguish
"those fundamental rights in property which it was intended to secure
upon the same terms to citizens of every race and color."8 The deci-
sion cooled legislative ardor for additional segregation in other areas
of American life. Second, Buchanan stopped the movement to enact
residential segregation ordinances in American cities. It spared the
United States the problems flowing from officially sanctioned neigh-
borhood apartheid, which would have left blacks seeking housing in a
much worse position.9 Third, Buchanan raised the hopes of blacks for
eventual redress of grievances and spurred renewed civil rights activ-
ism. In short, the impact of Buchanan should not be minimized.
Rather, as A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., has argued, "Buchanan was of
profound importance in applying a brake to decelerate what would
have been run-away racism in the United States."1o
5. 334 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1948). The problem of racial covenants is treated in CLEMENT E.
VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY: THE SUPREME COURT, THE N.A.A.C.P. AND THE RESTRICTIVE
COVENANT CASES (1967).
6. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 70 (1991) (finding that racial segregation in housing appeared to be getting worse in
the 1970s).
7. See id. (doubting the capacity of courts to achieve significant social reform).
8. Buchanan v. Warey, 245 U.S. 60, 79 (1917).
9. Indeed, there was the distinct possibility that residential segregation ordinances
would have been directed against other groups as well. See J.R. POLE, THE PURSUIT OF
EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 319 (rev. ed. 1993) (suggesting that Jews were threatened by
segregation ordinances); see also Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 313 (N.D.
Ohio 1924), rev'd, 272 U.S. 365 (1926) ("And it is equally apparent that the next step in the
exercise of this police power would be to apply similar restrictions for the purpose of segregating
in like manner various groups of newly arrived immigrants.").
10. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 2, at 126.
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Klarman sees Buchanan "as a substantive due process/property
rights case, rather than as one fundamentally concerning race."11
This penchant to pigeonhole cases is a legacy of the dubious
subordination of property rights in New Deal constitutional thought.12
It is fundamentally at odds with the historic link between property
ownership and liberty. The framers of the Constitution and the
Fourteenth Amendment did not distinguish property from other
personal rights.13 It would be more persuasive to treat Buchanan as a
case which affirmed the interdependence of all individual rights. A
vigorous judicial defense of individual property rights in Buchanan
aided racial minorities by destroying legal barriers to the acquisition
of housing. Indeed, given the often failed legacy of government efforts
to alter embedded social practices, it may be that Buchanan correctly
identified the central role that private choice plays in the elimination
of discrimination.
The labeling of Buchanan as a property rights case points to a
more troublesome aspect of Kiarman's analysis. He is skeptical that
judicial protection of economic liberty serves to safeguard civil rights.
Recognizing that "laissez-faire constitutionalism may produce inci-
dental benefits to the cause of civil rights," Klarman nonetheless
maintains that the relationship between property rights "and racial
justice is contingent and contextual, not necessary and universal. " 14
At one level such a conclusion is hardly a surprise. Respect for the
rights of property owners has been historically tied to individual
liberty, not egalitarian schemes. Yet, at another level, I suggest that
Klarman's approach could be turned on its head. Implicit in
Klarman's analysis is the notion that free market ordering is unlikely
to serve the interests of minorities. However, why should one assume
that regulatory legislation is beneficial to racial minorities? Is not
11. Michael J. Klarman, Race and the Court in the Progressive Era, 51 VAND. L. REV. 883,
937 (1998); cf LOREN P. BETH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, 1877-1917,
at 184 (1971) (describing Buchanan as "a case more often categorized under race relations").
12. See Jonathan R. Macey, Some Courses and Consequences of the Bifurcated Treatment
of Economic Rights and 'Other' Rights Under the United States Constitution, 9 SOC. PHIL. &
POL. 141, 145-55 (1992) (criticizing past and present dichotomous treatment of economic and
non-economic rights); Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 SuP. CT.
REV. 397, 399 (describing differentiation between economic and individual rights as "[t]wo-tiered
scrutiny" that paved the way for interest group politics).
13. See Stuart Bruchey, The Impact of Concern for the Security of Property Rights on the
Legal System of the Early American Republic, 1980 WIS. L. REV. 1135, 1136-43 (also discussing
the Framers' view); Edward J. Erler, The Great Fence to Liberty: The Right to Property in the
American Founding, in LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 43, 44-47 (Ellen Frankel Paul & Howard Dickman eds., 1989) (discussing the
Framers' view of property rights).
14. Klarman, supra note 11, at 941.
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law usually an instrument of majoritarian will? Would a larger
measure of private economic ordering have better served the needs of
underdogs?
A look at the growth of land use controls in the early twentieth
century dispels any illusion that regulation is a consistent friend of
the disadvantaged. Elitist assumptions and exclusionary policies
were part and parcel of zoning from the outset, and indeed help to
explain the popularity of land use regimes.15 New York City's pio-
neering comprehensive zoning ordinance of 1916 was prompted by the
desire of merchants to preserve the upscale character of Fifth Avenue
from encroachment by the garment industry.16 In the same vein,
Progressive Era land use regulators did not attempt to disguise their
views about the appropriate racial composition of neighborhoods. The
appearance of residential segregation ordinances as an early land use
control tool simply reflected the prevalent racial norms of the day.
Like separate railroad car laws, such ordinances were an example of
regulatory interference with the free market in order to advance
community values.
17
Perceiving a threat to the property rights of individuals, some
courts were initially hostile to zoning ordinances. Taking aim at the
exclusionary potential of land use controls, the Supreme Court of
Texas declared in 1921:
It would be tyranny to say to a poor man who happens to own a lot within a
residence district of palatial structures and his title subject to no servitude,
that he could not erect an humble home upon it suited to his means, or that
any residence he might erect must equal in grandeur those about it.'
5
15. See Martha A. Lees, Preserving Property Values? Preserving Proper Homes?
Preserving Privilege? The Pre-Euclid Debate Over Zoning for Exclusively Private Residential
Areas, 1916-1926, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 367, 368-70 (1994) (noting that the early zoning
ordinances were prompted by a desire of wealthy neighborhoods to protect property values by
excluding minorities); see also Garrett Power, Advocates at Cross-Purposes: The Briefs on
Behalf of Zoning in the Supreme Court, 1997-2 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 79, 82-86 (discussing
exclusionary motives behind zoning).
16. See KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAw IN AMERICAN HISTORY 292-93 (1989)
(discussing New York City's 1916 zoning ordinance); SEYMOUR I. TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN 172-87
(1969) (discussing the efforts of New York City's Commission on Building Districts and
Restrictions, established in 1914).
17. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAws 114 (1992) (arguing that "the success in controlling the politics of racial
domination did not [require] the courts to override the behavior of private individuals in
markets. It was quite sufficient for them to protect markets against legislative intervention.").
18. Spann v. City of Dallas, 235 S.W. 513, 516 (Tex. 1921).
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Similarly, the trial judge in the famous case of Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co. relied in part on Buchanan to invalidate zoning.
He recognized that the real purpose of zoning was "to classify the
population and segregate them according to their income or situations
in life." 19
The judicial emphasis on the right to acquire, use, and alienate
property seemingly imposed a serious impediment to the acceptance
of zoning. At least one court equated an ordinance excluding stores
from a residential area with residential segregation ordinances.
Finding that an ordinance which prohibited the erection of a store
constituted a deprivation of property without due process, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey emphatically observed:
It is true that in growing cities there are often created what is termed
"blighted areas." They may, in some instances, have come from the placing of
stores in residential sections. Blighted areas, however, more frequently arise
by the purchase in some residential section of a city of properties by members
of a race different in color or nationality from those who have been living in
that section which prompts the other residents in that section to move to other
sections of the city more congenial. An ordinance which would obligate
persons of different nationalities or religion or color to live in different and
specified sections of a city would, we think, be held unreasonable and discrimi-
natory.20
It is important to note that this property rights rationale had an in-
clusionary impact with respect to commercial establishments and
minorities. But it represents a path that ultimately was not taken.
In Euclid, of course, the Supreme Court sustained the consti-
tutionality of a zoning scheme which divided a locality into residential
and commercial districts.21  Although the decision was vaguely
couched in terms of safeguarding the public health, safety, and mor-
als, the opinion stressed the desirability of excluding commercial
establishments and apartment buildings from single-family residen-
tial neighborhoods.22 It is puzzling that the Court never mentioned
Buchanan.23 One may speculate that the Justices perceived that the
19. Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1924), rev'd, 272
U.S. 365 (1926).
20. Ignaciunas v. Risley, 121 A. 783, 786 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1923), affd sub nom., Ignaciunas v.
Town of Nutley, 125 A. 121 (N.J. 1924).
21. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 396-97 (1926).
22. See id. at 388-95.
23. The trial judge in Euclid relied partly on the property rights reasoning in Buchanan to
invalidate comprehensive zoning. He found the arguments in favor of the Louisville racial
segregation ordinance to be more compelling than those seeking to justify general land use
controls under the police power. Ambler Realty, 297 F. at 312-13.
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property rights rationale of Buchanan was at odds with the Euclidean
concept of land use controls. In practice, zoning was employed to
protect the character of existing neighborhoods, to stabilize property
values, and to keep out land uses or persons deemed undesirable.24
Zoning placed a premium on majority preferences, not on the rights of
individual owners. Indeed, the exclusionary implications of Euclid
did not escape the attention of contemporaries. The decision sparked
renewed interest in passing residential segregation ordinances.25
Pointing to the high place of property rights in the constitu-
tional polity, the Supreme Court in Buchanan invalidated the resi-
dential segregation law. But Buchanan proved to be something of an
aberration and did not lead to careful scrutiny of zoning generally.
Following Euclid, most courts deferred to the regulation of land use
by local governments and adopted a hands-off position.26 Local regu-
latory authorities enjoyed virtually a blank check free of constitu-
tional restraint. This meant in reality that land controls were crafted
by those already living within the localities to advance their goals,
which often entailed preservation of the status quo. Such an envi-
ronment was conducive to the spread of exclusionary zoning. After
all, the impact of insider decisionmaking fell largely on outsiders and
potential residents. Belatedly, liberal commentators, who for decades
had been preaching judicial deference to economic and social legisla-
tion, began to express alarm about the spatial separation of the poor
and minorities from middle class communities. 27 With respect to land
use patterns, liberal constitutionalism produced an ironic
result-disregard for the property rights of individuals had
empowered communities to enact laws that effectively excluded
persons according to majority sentiment.
24. See ROBERT H. NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LAND-USE REGULATION 11-18 (1977) (noting that the protection of
neighborhood quality was the aim of zoning).
25. See Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentrification: Explicating a Right to Protective
Zoning in Low-Income Communities of Color, 77 MINN. L. REV. 739, 749-50 (1993) (discussing
racial zoning after Euclid).
26. See NELSON, supra note 24, at 202 ("The policy of the courts has generally been to
avoid interfering in community zoning.").
27. This concern has achieved its most aggressive expression in the protracted Mount
Laurel litigation in New Jersey. Reversing decades of deference to local zoning bodies, the New
Jersey Supreme Court adopted a variety of sweeping remedies intended to compel communities
to rezone and accept low-income housing. Rather than reconsidering the basic issue of public
controls over privately-owned land, the New Jersey court in effect imposed an additional level of
regulation. See generally DENNIS J. COYLE, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION: SHAPING
SOCIETY THROUGH LAND USE REGULATIONS 53-111 (1993) (discussing the Mount Laurel
litigation); CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE, AND AUDACIOUS JUDGES
(1996) (also discussing this litigation).
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As this brief sketch indicates, land use controls have tended to
reinforce the exclusionary impulse shared by most homeowners, and
given scant heed to civil rights concerns. I suggest that meaningful
judicial review of zoning, in order to vindicate the property rights of
individuals, would permit individual owners and consumers to have a
larger voice in determining housing patterns. Under such an ap-
proach, insistence upon property rights could become a vehicle to
benefit the less affluent by curbing land use controls.28 Surely, the
experience of land use controls should make one cautious about as-
suming that regulation necessarily promotes some broad public inter-
est.
B. Bernstein
In opposition to Kiarman, Bernstein pictures Buchanan as a
signal victory for both blacks and property rights. He advances the
striking thesis that blacks have suffered disproportionately from
governmental interference with the operation of the free market.
Bernstein has convincingly developed elsewhere the argument that
licensure requirements, 29 emigrant agent laws,30 and wage regula-
tions31 systematically handicapped blacks in the marketplace. He
contends, therefore, that judicial protection of economic liberty was of
particular assistance to racial minorities with little political influence.
Bernstein applies this insight to his treatment of Buchanan.
He traces in detail the emergence of residential segregation laws,
starting with the Baltimore ordinance of 1910.32 Bernstein empha-
sizes that legal experts almost universally maintained that such laws
were a valid exercise of the police power and were unconcerned about
the negative impact on individual property rights. The reaction to
Buchanan was revealing. Bernstein points out that prominent law
reviews were astonishingly hostile to the decision. Writers attacked
28. See EPSTEIN, supra note 17, at 116 (noting "the close connection between the constitu-
tional protection of property rights and the protection of members of minority groups").
29. See David E. Bernstein, Licensing Laws: A Historical Example of the Use of
Government Regulatory Power Against African-Americans, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 89 (1994).
30. See David E. Bernstein, The Law and Economics of Post-Civil War Restrictions on
Interstate Migration by African-Americans, 76 TEX. L. REV. 781 (1998).
31. See David E. Bernstein, The Davis-Bacon Act: Vestige of Jim Crow, 13 NAT'L BLACK
L.J. 276 (1994); David E. Bernstein, Roots of the "Underclass: The Decline of Laissez-Faire
Jurisprudence and the Rise of Racist Labor Legislation, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 85 (1993).
32. See David E. Bernstein, Philip Sober Controlling Philip Drunk: Buchanan v. Warley
in Historical Perspective, 51 VAND. L. REV. 799 (1998); cf Garrett Power, Apartheid Baltimore
Style: The Residential Segregation Ordinance of 1910-1913, 42 MD. L. REV. 289, 289-323 (1983)
(discussing the emergence of residential segregation laws).
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the Supreme Court for upholding property rights in the face of both
community sentiment and social science evidence which stressed the
desirability of residential segregation.33
Throughout his article Bernstein takes aim at Progressive
jurisprudence. The Progressives downplayed individual rights, ac-
centing instead collective action and the common good. They dis-
played boundless confidence in expert management of the economy to
achieve economic justice.34 As Herbert Hovenkamp has explained:
"Progressive legal thought was characterized by a belief that govern-
ment regulation often allocates resources better than private mar-
kets."35 Zoning, with its promise of scientific management to replace
the haphazard municipal development of the past, was congenial with
the Progressive fondness for planning and reliance on experts.36
Consequently, Progressives rejected rights language in favor of gov-
ernmental controls37 It followed that Progressive jurisprudence
looked with disfavor on judicial efforts to enforce constitutional limits
on governmental authority.
The claims of property owners were not the only rights ad-
versely affected by Progressive ideology. For instance, Progressives
displayed little interest in free speech during the years preceding
World War I. As Mark A. Graber has explained, "[m]ost prominent
early twentieth-century proponents of federal and state economic
regulation also supported federal and state speech regulations."38 In
the same vein, David M. Rabban has cogently observed: "The com-
33. See, e.g., George D. Hott, Constitutionality of Municipal Zoning and Segregation
Ordinances, 33 W. VA. L.Q. 332, 345-49 (1927) (discussing state court adherence to Buchanan
and questioning whether the decision was a desirable one); Comment, Unconstitutionality of
Segregation Ordinances, 27 YALE L.J. 393, 395-96 (1917) (discussing impact of decision on
ownership market for unimproved real estate and characterizing Buchanan as a restraint on
alienation); Note, Constitutionality of Segregation Ordinances, 16 MICH. L. REV. 109, 111 (1917)
(citing earlier Supreme Court precedent that would justify an overruling of Buchanan).
34. See Bernstein, supra note 32, at 816-17; see also HALL, supra note 16, at 196-97
(discussing the Progressives); WILLIAM G. Ross, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES,
AND LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890-1937, at 14, 106-09 (1994) (discussing the
Progressives' faith in scientific management by an educated elite in government).
35. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Mind and Heart of Progressive Legal Thought, 81 IOWA L.
REV. 149, 149 (1995).
36. See MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY: PUBLIC POLICY, AND ECONOMIC
CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1900-1933, at 186-91 (1990) (noting that "[clitywide zoning found ready
nourishment in the prevailing mind-set of the Progressive years").
37. See Daniel T. Rodgers, Rights Consciousness in American History, in THE BILL OF
RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA: AFTER 200 YEARS 3, 12-13 (David J. Bodenhamer & James W.
Ely, Jr. eds., 1993) (discussing abandonment of rights rhetoric by Progressive Party in its
platform).




mitment of progressives to the creation of a harmonious community
also limited their conception of free speech. While often recognizing
the social value of criticism, Progressives ignored and occasionally
condemned dissent that did not contribute to the community."3
9
Likewise, Progressives placed great faith in the use of government to
police moral norms. As David J. Langum has pointed out,
Progressives believed that by "the proper use of social engineering,
often employing the coercion of the federal government, individual
human behavior could be controlled and changed through legisla-
tion."40 The Progressive Era saw an outpouring of morals regulation
designed to strengthen the community by eliminating social problems.
In areas of personal behavior, individual freedom was subordinated to
the perceived needs of the society. Drawing no distinction between
economic and other liberties, the Progressives viewed with suspicion
all claims of individual right.
41
Bernstein has rendered a valuable service by casting a critical
eye on the supposed reforms of the Progressive Era. Historians have
for too long assumed the benevolent character of the economic legisla-
tion urged by the Progressives. Moreover, the treatment of property
rights in the early twentieth century has commonly been presented
within the simplistic discourse of a conflict between the public inter-
est and a judiciary devoted to big business.42 Yet it unfairly loads the
historical deck to presume the benign purpose and effect of
Progressive legislation. The actual picture is much less tidy. The
expanded power of government, promoted by Progressives, proved no
panacea for economic problems and created new possibilities to in-
fringe property rights and private economic decisionmaking.43 Not
39. DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 212 (1997).
40. DAVID J. LANGUM, CROSSING OVER THE LINE: LEGISLATING MORALITY AND THE MANN
ACT 6 (1994).
41. See Rodgers, supra note 37, at 12-13.
42. See ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, AMERICAN CONSERVATISM IN THE AGE OF ENTERPRISE,
1865-1910, at 81-84 (1951) (arguing that the Supreme Court sacrificed the weak and the poor for
the strong and the wealthy); ARTHUR SELWYN MILLER, THE MODERN CORPORATE STATE:
PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 45-46 (1976) (charging the early
twentieth century courts with not caring about laborers); see also MORTON J. HORWITz, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 7 (1992)
(criticizing "the standard mode of explanation").
43. See Hovenkamp, supra note 35, at 157 ("Government regulation proved to be one of
the great embarrassments of Progressive legal thought."). It has been argued, for example, that
Progressive era railroad legislation was ill-considered and severely hurt the rail industry. See
generally ALBRO MARTIN, ENTERPRISE DENIED: ORIGINS OF THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN
RAILROADS, 1897-1917 (1971). Similarly, historians have become increasingly skeptical about
the efficacy of Progressive measures to curb trusts and the Progressive faith in expert
management of the economy. See HIGGS, supra note 3, at 106-22.
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content with the usual platitudes about reform, Bernstein invites a
fundamental reassessment of the judiciary and economic liberty dur-
ing the age of Progressivism.
As both Kiarman and Bernstein show, the relationship be-
tween property, liberty, and race is complex and ambiguous. If the
workings of the free market have not always aided racial minorities,
they have done so at least as often as governmental regulation. The
overlooked legacy of Buchanan is that principled adherence to the
constitutional norm of private property has a liberating potential for
individuals.44
III. THE PLACE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE PoLITY
In addition to contributing to a better understanding of
Buchanan v. Warley, these articles raise broader questions concerning
the place of property rights in the polity. Two such issues deserve
particular attention. The first is the relationship between private
property and liberty. The second is the need for a fresh look at the
history of the concept of due process as a check on governmental
power.
A. Property and Liberty
A better appreciation of Buchanan should help us to reclaim
the vital role of property rights in the constitutional scheme.
Historically, private property served as a bulwark of individual liberty
and marked the constitutional boundaries of legitimate government.45
Protection of property was consistent with a central tenet of American
constitutionalism-restraint of governmental authority over indi-
viduals. A constitutional system based on private property tends to
diffuse power throughout society, and thus to limit coercive power in
the hands of government. It reflected the traditional view that liberty
was best preserved by restraining the reach of government.
This high standing of property ownership in political thought
was reflected in numerous provisions of the Constitution and the Bill
of Rights. Foremost among these were the Contract Clause, the Due
Process Clause, and the Takings Clause. Likewise, a number of state
44. See COYLE, supra note 27, at 238-62 (arguing for the protection of private property
rights).
45. See ELY, supra note 4, at 43 (discussing the importance of property ownership as a
"fundamental tenet" of Anglo-American legal thinking).
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constitutions embraced the natural law tradition that all persons
have the right of "acquiring, possessing and protecting property."46
Not surprisingly, therefore, for much of American history the
Supreme Court and state tribunals championed economic liberty
against legislative interference. As Jennifer Nedelsky has aptly ob-
served:
But the notion that property and contract were essential ingredients of the
liberty the Constitution was to protect, was common to Madison, Marshall, and
the twentieth-century advocates of laissez-faire. And the idea that property
and contract could define the legitimate scope of governmental power was a
basic component of constitutionalism from 1787 to 1937.47
This did not mean that the courts invalidated economic regulations on
a wholesale basis. On the contrary, the majority of regulations passed
constitutional muster.48 Still, judges carefully scrutinized economic
regulations and required lawmakers to justify exercises of the police
power which infringed upon the property rights of individuals.
Buchanan forcefully demonstrates that regard for property
rights is not an end in itself, but is also important for securing indi-
vidual autonomy and other personal liberties. Consider the case in
the context of black economic aspirations. Since emancipation, blacks
had manifested a strong desire to acquire land. As blacks increas-
ingly migrated to cities in the upper South during the late nineteenth
century, however, this dream was frustrated. Black newcomers were
compelled to live in congested and rundown neighborhoods. Yet as
blacks began to accumulate wealth, they renewed their drive for bet-
ter housing. Land ownership was both an economic goal and a potent
symbol of freedom.49
Against this background, Buchanan assumes a special signifi-
cance. It affirms that economic liberty is directed as much to obtain-
ing property as to securing the interests of existing owners. 50 In
46. Id. at 30.
47. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 228(1990).
48. See Melvin I. Urofsky, State Courts and Protective Legislation During the Progressive
Era: A Reevaluation, 72 J. AM. HIST. 63, 64 (1985) (stating that the "larger spread of state court
decisions" reveals approval of a "wide range of reform legislation"); Charles Warren, The
Progressiveness of the United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L. REv. 294, 296-307 (1913)
(summarizing state laws upheld by Supreme Court from 1888-1913).
49. See LOREN SCHWENINGER, BLACK PROPERTY OWNERS IN THE SOUTH, 1790-1915, at 143-
84(1990).
50. See, e.g., THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 393 (1868)
("The man or the class forbidden the acquisition or enjoyment of property in the manner
permitted to the community at large would be deprived of liberty in particulars of primary
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Buchanan, the Supreme Court defined property broadly: "Property is
more than the mere thing which a person owns. It is elementary that
it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it. The
Constitution protects these essential attributes of property."5
1
Building upon this insight, the Justices ruled that the
Fourteenth Amendment operated "to qualify and entitle a colored
man to acquire property without state legislation discriminating
against him solely because of color."52 Buchanan, then, exemplifies
the historic tendency of constitutional law to encourage the dynamic
and creative aspects of property ownership rather than to just uphold
the status quo. By placing a high value on the acquisition and use of
property, the Justices tried to keep open the channels of change even
for racial minorities.
Judicial protection of individual economic rights was aban-
doned in 1937 as a consequence of New Deal jurisprudence. New
Dealers envisioned an active role for government in managing the
economy and promoting the general social welfare. Judicial deference
to legislative control over economic life became the new orthodoxy. 3
In a sharp break with the past, courts sought to fashion an untenable
distinction between economic liberty and other personal rights.54 The
libertarian legacy of cases like Buchanan was ignored for decades.
Changes in the intellectual and political climate, however, have
opened the door for a revival of interest in property rights.
Questioning the efficacy of government regulations, a number of
prominent scholars have urged a return to judicial review of economic
legislation.55 The full implications of this movement are beyond the
importance to his or their 'pursuit of happiness.' "); see also Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501, 511-12
(1855), overruled in part by Schmitt v. F.W. Cook Brewing Co., 120 N.E. 19 (Ind. 1918); 2 JAMES
KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *1-*3 (0. Halsted, 1827-28).
51. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74(1917).
52. Id. at 79.
53. See James W. Ely, Jr., The Enigmatic Place of Property Rights in Modern
Constitutional Thought, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA: AFTER 200 YEARS 87, 90
(David J. Bodenhamer & James W. Ely, Jr. eds., 1993) (criticizing the dichotomous treatment of
economic interests and individual rights).
54. See Antonin Scalia, Economic Affairs as Human Affairs, in ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND
THE JUDICIARY 31-37 (James A. Dorn & Henry G. Manne eds., 1987) (declaring that "in the real
world a stark dichotomy between economic freedoms and civil rights does not exist"); see also
Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) ("In fact, a fundamental interde-
pendence exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal right in property.
Neither could have meaning without the other. That rights in property are basic civil rights has
long been recognized.").
55. See, e.g., BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 324-31
(1980) (discussing legal and policy reasons supporting enhanced standard of review for economic
legislation); Richard A. Epstein, The Mistakes of 1937, 11 GEO. MASON L. REv. 5, 13-20 (1988)
(discussing wage regulation statutes and arguing for a re-examination of West Coast Hotel);
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scope of my comment, but the fresh interest in the property rights of
individuals should help us to reclaim the traditional belief that the
focus on property in decisions like Buchanan safeguards liberty by
limiting government power.
B. Substantive Due Process
A study of Buchanan also highlights the need for a reassess-
ment of substantive due process. The picture drawn of this doctrine
too often veers into caricature. The standard account holds that
judges developed a substantive reading of the due process clauses
during the post-Civil War era in order to safeguard the interests of
business enterprise from legislative regulation.56 Under substantive
due process, courts required lawmakers to justify economic regula-
tions, and struck down laws deemed unreasonable or arbitrary as a
violation of due process. Critics paint a dark picture of how this doc-
trine operated. They accuse the justices of substituting their own
economic judgments for those of elected lawmakers under the guise of
enforcing constitutional values.57 Moreover, they view substantive
due process as a major barrier to economic reform. Justice David
Souter, for example, has exclaimed that the Supreme Court "routinely
invalidated state social and economic legislation under an expansive
conception of Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process."5s
According to the conventional wisdom, the Court abandoned the mis-
taken notion that due process encompassed substantive legal princi-
ples as part of the constitutional revolution of 1937. Today, we are
Wayne McCormack, Economic Substantive Due Process and the Right of Livelihood, 82 KY. L.J.
397, 457-63 (1993-1994) (urging due process review of market entry restrictions); Michael J.
Phillips, Entry Restrictions in the Lochner Court, 4 GEO. MASON L. REV. 405, 457-55 (1996)
(urging due process review of market entry restrictions); see also Note, Resurrecting Economic
Rights: The Doctrine of Economic Due Process Reconsidered, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1363, 1377-83
(1990) (calling for heightened judicial activism in the areas of economic and social legislation).
56. See generally BENJAMIN R. TwIss, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION: How LAISSEZ-
FAIRE CAME TO THE CONSTITUTION (1942) (tracing interplay of laissez-faire economics and police
power regulation).
57. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 43-49 (1990) (discussing cases and arguing that Due Process Clause, as originally under-
stood, was void of substantive content); MELVIN I. UROFSKY, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 496-502 (1988) (positing similar argument).
58. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 605 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting); see also
UROFSKY, supra note 57, at 501. For a contrary view, see Michael J. Phillips, How Many Times
Was Lochner-Era Substantive Due Process Effective?, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1049, 1080-89 (1997)
(analyzing the number of cases in which the Supreme Court invalidated laws on due process
grounds, and concluding that the number of such decisions is less than commonly asserted).
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told, both liberal and conservative scholars agree that substantive due
process is dead, at least with respect to economic matters.5 9
I suggest that every aspect of this tale is suspect. The dire
legend of substantive due process was invented by scholars associated
with the Progressive movement in order to further their regulatory
agenda.60 One should start a fresh analysis by examining terminol-
ogy. It bears emphasis that the very phrase "substantive due process"
is anachronistic when used to describe decisions rendered during the
supposed heyday of the doctrine. Indeed, courts did not differentiate
between procedural and substantive due process until the New Deal
era.61 Even though the unitary understanding of due process shat-
tered in the late 1930s, no Supreme Court justice employed the term
"substantive due process" until 1948.62
The concept of due process can be traced to the principle ex-
pressed in Magna Carta that persons could not be deprived of life,
liberty, or property except by "the law of the land."63 The initial state
constitutions used the phrase "law of the land," not due process of
law.64 Indeed, this older wording can be found in a number of current
state constitutions. 6 The "law of the land" concept encompassed
various unenumerated rights, including economic liberty. As scholars
have chronicled, state courts began to fashion substantive interpreta-
tions of due process before the Civil War.66 Much of this emerging
59. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 57, at 57-58 (discussing abandonment of economic due
process); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvIEW 14-20
(1980).
60. The works of the Progressive historians were informed by a critical perspective toward
the Constitution as an anti-democratic document as well as a desire to encourage social and
economic change by lowering constitutional barriers to legislative reform. See RICHARD
HOFSTADTER, THE PROGRESSIVE HISTORIANS (1968). According to Hofstadter, Progressives
began to argue that "the courts must no longer be regarded as sacrosanct, and to try to find
ways of curbing their power." Id. at 202.
61. See McCormack, supra note 55, at 404 ("No recognized distinction between procedural
and substantive due process existed until after the New Deal eliminated the substantive pro-
tections.").
62. Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 90 (1948) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting).
63. See Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 941, 948-63
(tracing development of clause in England from Magna Carta period through seventeenth
century). See generally A. E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA (1965).
64. See Riggs, supra note 63, at 973-77 (summarizing state constitutional documents); see,
e.g., MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XXI (1776); MASSACHUSETTS DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS, art. XII (1780); NORTH CAROLINA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XII (1776).
65. See, e.g., MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XXIV (1978); TENNESSEE
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. I, § 8 (1870).
66. See Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24
HARV. L. REV. 366, 370-85 (1911) (using examples to show due process limits on legislative
1998] 967
968 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:953
substantive due process limited legislative power by voiding class
legislation which conferred special benefits or imposed unique bur-
dens.67 Thomas M. Cooley, the most influential constitutional theorist
of the late nineteenth century, embraced a substantive understanding
of due process in his landmark work, A Treatise on the Constitutional
Limitations.68 Cooley explained that due process was intended to
safeguard individuals from the arbitrary exercise of governmental
power, and was not confined to "rules that pertain to forms of
procedure merely."69
Following the Civil War, the Supreme Court gradually ac-
cepted the premise that the due process clause imposed substantive
as well as procedural restraints on government. In essence, the Jus-
tices reasoned that the concept of due process guaranteed those fun-
damental rights of individuals which were essential to a free society.70
The Court initially employed substantive due process in the area of
state railroad rate regulations, holding that regulated industries were
constitutionally entitled to receive a reasonable return on invest-
ment.7 1 The rise of substantive due process was linked with the eco-
power despite failure to contemplate judicial review in state constitutions); Lowell J. Howe, The
Meaning of "Due Process of Law" Prior to the Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, 18 CAL. L.
REV. 583, 590-610 (1930); Earl M. Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment Concepts in the Antebellum
Era, 32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 305, 317 (1988) (discussing role of substantive due process in "class
legislation" cases and discussing "pure vested rights" theory); Riggs, supra note 63, at 977-84
(linking "law of the land" arguments in early cases to development of state constitutional law).
67. Under the influence of the Jacksonian movement, antebellum state courts were often
hostile to legislation granting special privileges to any class. As state courts began to review
exercises of legislative authority, they distinguished between legitimate police power measures
and arbitrary laws which did not advance the public welfare. The latter category of statutes
were deemed invalid because they did not satisfy the "law of the land" clause or the emerging
concept of due process. See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND
DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWER JURISPRUDENCE 45-60 (1993) (discussing formative
years of police power jurisprudence); DAVID M. GOLD, THE SHAPING OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY
LAW: JOHN APPLETON AND RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUALISM 137-41 (1990) (noting rise of laissez-
faire constitutionalism and discussing John Appleton's commitment to equal rights).
68. See COOLEY, supra note 50.
69. Id. at 356.
70. The complex issue of due process as a substantive restraint on government cannot be
examined here in detail. For thoughtful studies, see Glen 0. Robinson, Evolving Conceptions of
'Property' and 'Liberty' in Due Process Jurisprudence, in LIBERTY, PROPERTY AND GOVERNMENT:
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION BEFORE THE NEW DEAL 72-79 (Ellen Frankel Paul & Howard
Dickman eds., 1989) (analyzing reach of procedural and substantive due process); G. Edward
White, Revisiting Substantive Due Process and Holmes's Lochner Dissent, 63 BROOK. L. REv. 87,
107-23 (1997) (discussing substantive due process and police power analysis).
71. During the 1890s the Supreme Court emphasized that the Due Process Clause placed
substantive limits on legislative regulation of railroad property. See RICHARD C. CORTNER, THE
IRON HORSE AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE RAILROADS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 10-12 (1993) (noting that Supreme Court begins to recognize
substantive due process claims in this context after Granger Cases); James W. Ely, Jr., The
Railroad Question Revisited: Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway v. Minnesota and
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nomic individualism of the nineteenth century, but due process pro-
tection also extended to other liberties, such as free expression.7 2
Under substantive due process review, courts would not simply
accept at face value legislative declarations about protecting the pub-
lc. a Rather, courts would examine both the goals to be served by
governmental action as well as the means employed to achieve the
objective. They independently weighed the evidence to determine
whether a regulatory measure was a valid exercise of the police power
or an arbitrary restriction of individual rights. Although it was ad-
mittedly difficult for judges to draw consistent lines between permis-
sible and unconstitutional legislation, they were engaged in a legiti-
mate inquiry into the nature and extent of due process protection.
Given the long association of property ownership with individual
liberty and the high value placed on contractual freedom by nine-
teenth century Americans, it is hardly a surprise that both state and
federal courts often relied on substantive due process to vindicate
economic freedom. 74
Ignoring the libertarian foundation of substantive due process,
liberal critics in the twentieth century asserted that the courts were
just acting to safeguard the business community against regulation.
They insisted that a substantive reading of the Due Process Clause
subverted its original meaning as a guarantee of procedural regular-
ity.7 5 In time, this view hardened into a widely-accepted orthodoxy.
Constitutional Limits on State Regulations, in LAW AND THE GREAT PLAINS: ESSAYS ON THE
LEGAL HISTORY OF THE HEARTLAND 73-91 (John R. Wunder ed., 1996) (noting Court's tendency
to link substantive due process with deprivation of property interest).
72. Contrary to standard historical accounts, conservative jurists and commentators
during the early twentieth century maintained that due process protected both liberty of
expression and economic rights. Indeed, because conservatives were committed to the notion of
limited government, they experienced less difficulty in fashioning a defense of free speech than
did the Progressives. See GRABER, supra note 38, at 1-74. In New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,
285 U.S. 262, 280 (1932), for instance, Justice George Sutherland, writing for the majority,
equated free speech with entrepreneurial liberty. For Sutherland's record in championing
expressive rights, see HADLEY ARKES, THE RETURN OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND: RESTORING A
JURISPRUDENCE OF NATURAL RIGHTS 250-56 (1994).
73. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE W. FULLER, 1888-1910,
at 61-65, 85-103 (1995) (chronicling Supreme Court's acceptance of substantive due process in
late nineteenth century).
74. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAw, 1836-1937, at 171-204
(1991) (arguing that doctrine of substantive due process was shaped by prevailing economic
ideology).
75. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 249-82 (1977) (characterizing development of substantive due process
as a phenomenon where "courts substitute their own views of policy for those of legislative
bodies"); JOHN MORTON BLUM, THE PROGRESSIVE PRESIDENTS 31-32 (1980) (discussing
perception among Progressives that substantive due process posed a barrier to economic
reform); 2 LOUIS B. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 374-96 (1932) (noting that a key
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This interpretation, however, has been sharply challenged in recent
years,76 and some scholars have urged a revival of substantive due
process review of economic legislation.
Too often critics have generalized about the doctrine of sub-
stantive due process on the basis of a few cases. The most visible
decisions invoking substantive due process, such as Lochner v. New
York 77 and Adkins v. Children's Hospital,78 are those invalidating laws
which sought to ameliorate industrial working conditions. But one
cannot fairly judge the doctrine by focusing on a handful of high pro-
file cases. In fact, the employment cases were not typical of substan-
tive due process jurisprudence. Rather, the Supreme Court most
commonly relied on due process review to strike down utility rate
controls, price regulations, and entry barriers that impeded competing
enterprise.7 9 In addition, the Court rendered several decisions vindi-
cating personal liberty grounded on substantive due process
grounds.80 Since the vast majority of legislation passed constitutional
development in articulation of the meaning of due process was the shift in emphasis from
executive branch to judiciary); EDWARD S. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION 107-09 (1938)
(noting that expansive reading of Due Process Clause, as opposed to original interpretation of
ensuring a fair trial for accused persons, permits Supreme Court to rule on substantive content
of legislation).
76. Scholars have demonstrated growing interest in the jurisprudence and jurists of the
period 1890 to 1937. Although they differ in many respects, revisionist historians offer a more
balanced account of substantive due process and judicial protection of economic rights. See, e.g.,
ARKES, supra note 72, at 282-86 (analyzing substantive due process jurisprudence of Justice
Sutherland); ELY, supra note 73, at 61-65, 94-95 (summarizing work of federal courts and
theorists of this time); GILLMAN, supra note 67, at 101-46 (discussing tradition of neutral polity
and foreshadowing of Lochner); HOVENKAMP, supra note 74, at 171-204 (summarizing various
hypotheses historians have employed to explain substantive due process); PAUL KENS, JUSTICE
STEPHEN FIELD: SHAPING LIBERTY FROM THE GOLD RUSH TO THE GILDED AGE 157-66 (1997)
(anayzing jurisprudence of Justice Field); Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A
Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST.
REV. 293, 327-31 (1985) (noting symbiotic relationship between laissez-faire rights and legal-
political hostility toward "class legislation").
77. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). One of the most famous judicial decisions in American history,
Lochner has been the subject of a vast literature. For helpful and comprehensive treatments,
see GILLMAN, supra note 67, at 126-36; PAUL KENS, JUDICIAL POWER AND REFORM POLITICS:
THE ANATOMY OF LOCHNER V. NEw YORK (1990); Mary Cornelia Porter, Lochner and Company:
Revisionism Revisited, in LIBERTY, PROPERTY AND GOVERNMENT: CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION BEFORE THE NEW DEAL 11-38 (Ellen Frankel Paul & Howard Dickman eds.,
1989).
78. 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
For a spirited defense of Adkins, see ARKES, supra note 72, at 71-81.
79. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 74, at 179 (noting that under substantive due process
analysis "many statutes creating entry or licensing restrictions for various occupations or
professions were overturned"); Phillips, supra note 58, at 1073-75 (discussing use of due process
to eliminate entry barriers).
80. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding that compulsory
public school education unduly interferes with upbringing and education of children by parents
or guardians); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-03 (holding that state law banning
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muster, substantive due process viewed in historical perspective does
not appear such a fearsome bogey.
Buchanan illustrates the advantages of substantive due proc-
ess review, as well as the artificiality of classifying cases in terms of
economic or other personal liberties. Under substantive due process,
lawmakers were required to provide a convincing justification for
legislation which infringed individual liberties, such as the right to
acquire and use property. Consider how effectively this doctrine
operated in Buchanan. Proponents of the racial segregation ordi-
nance introduced a wealth of information to sustain their argument
that physical separation was the key to racial harmony.81 Justice
William R. Day, writing for the Court, conceded that "there exists a
serious and difficult problem arising from a feeling of race hostility
which the law is powerless to control," but he was unwilling to accept
the rationale for the segregation ordinance.8 2 Day highlighted a bla-
tant inconsistency between the terms of the ordinance and its pur-
ported goal. Although justified as "essential to the maintenance of the
purity of the races," the ordinance permitted "the employment of
colored servants in white families." 13 As Day perceived, this servant
exception contradicted the alleged purpose of the statute. Day was
equally unimpressed with the contention that racial segregation
would halt depreciation in property values. He pointed out that
"property may be acquired by undesirable white neighbors or put to
disagreeable though lawful uses with like results."84 Since the state
failed to offer a compelling rationale for interference with the eco-
nomic liberty to acquire and use property, Day concluded that the
black purchaser was deprived of property without due process of law.
teaching of foreign language violates due process). William G. Ross has written a fine account of
the Supreme Court's reliance on substantive due process in Pierce to invalidate a law requiring
all children to attend public schools. See WILLIAM G. Ross, FORGING NEW FREEDOMS:
NATiviSM, EDUCATION, AND THE CONSTITUTION, 1917-1927, at 148-73 (1994).
81. Although suspect to modern eyes, this argument cannot be dismissed out of hand. The
notion that segregation was a beneficial instrument which mitigated racial tension was common
during the early decades of the twentieth century. See Morton Sosna, The South in the Saddle:
Racial Polities During the Wilson Years, 54 WIS. MAG. HIST. 30 (1970) (discussing actions by
President Woodrow Wilson introducing segregation into the federal government). For a discus-
sion of the intellectual climate and political circumstances which confined the Supreme Court in
handling race cases, see James W. Ely, Jr., The South, the Supreme Court, and Race Relations,
1890-1965, in THE SOUTH AS AN AMERICAN PROBLEM 126, 127-33 (Larry J. Griffin & Don H.
Doyle eds., 1995).
82. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 61, 80 (1917).
83. Id. at 81.
84. Id. at 82.
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The Buchanan case is a reminder that a principled defense of
individual property rights, under a substantive reading of the Due
Process Clause, often safeguarded the interests of vulnerable and
powerless segments of society. This conclusion is strengthened by a
line of due process cases voiding anti-competitive entry barriers to
various businesses.5 In decisions such as New State Ice the Court
upset the status quo in order to vindicate the rights of fledgling en-
terprise.8 6 This record contradicts the prevalent but misleading image
of substantive due process as a handmaiden of the economically
powerful. Indeed, the record suggests that the best explanation for
substantive due process was a judicial commitment to the values of
limited government and economic rights that shaped the constitution-
making process in 1787.
Lastly, Buchanan informs the contemporary debate over the
role of the judiciary in American life. Despite repeated declarations
that substantive due process is dead and that courts will not substi-
tute their views for those of legislative bodies, in actuality substantive
due process has been revamped to guarantee a variety of non-eco-
nomic rights.87 What sense does this make? As Learned Hand ob-
served, "it would have seemed a strange anomaly [to the Framers of
the Fifth Amendment] to learn that they constituted severer restric-
tions as to Liberty than Property."88 It is clearly incompatible with
the views of the Framers to afford greater judicial protection to some
claims of right rather than others. The language of the Due Process
Clause draws no distinction between the protection given property
and other liberties. Ranking rights into categories not expressed in
the Constitution constitutes inappropriate judicial activism. Justice
Antonin Scalia has tellingly criticized the inconsistent use of substan-
tive due process: "The picking and choosing among various rights to
be accorded 'substantive due process' protection is alone enough to
arouse suspicion; but the categorical and inexplicable exclusion of so-
called 'economic rights' (even though the Due Process Clause explic-
85. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 278-80 (1932) (manufacture
and sale of ice); Louis K, Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928) (ownership of pharmacy
or drug stores by individuals who are not licensed pharmacists), overruled by North Dakota
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Store, 414 U.S. 156 (1973).
86. See ARKES, supra note 72, at 53-61 (applauding the decision in New State Ice for
upholding the economic freedom to enter lines of business); Phillips, supra note 55, at 440-47
(stressing that restrictions on market entry are anti-competitive, strengthen local monopolies,
and disadvantage consumers).
87. See WILLIAM M. WIECEK, LIBERTY UNDER LAW: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
LIFE 177-81 (1988) (surveying ebbs and tides of due process review).
88. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 50 (1958).
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itly applies to 'property') unquestionably involves policymaking rather
than neutral legal analysis.S9
Scalia is not the only observer troubled by continued reliance
on substantive due process. Morton J. Horwitz has aptly written:
"For about two decades after the end of World War II, the central
ideological question before the Supreme Court was whether judicial
activism was compatible with earlier Progressive commitments to
judicial restraint in the name of democracy." ° Accordingly, various
liberal scholars have engaged in extraordinary intellectual contortions
in an effort to distinguish "bad" judicial solicitude for economic rights
from "good" defense of non-economic liberties. 91 A discussion of this
dialogue is beyond the scope of this comment. But it is important to
note that the intellectual quandary over substantive due process
review would be eliminated by again extending meaningful judicial
scrutiny to property rights. Such a step would reclaim the long-stand-
ing view of due process as a substantive restraint on government, a
view that found classic expression in Buchanan.
89. United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment).
90. HoRwrrz, supra note 42, at 252.
91. See id. at 247-72 (discussing distinct judicial roles played in Brown and Lochner). For
a further elaboration of this point by Horwitz, see The Jurisprudence of Brown and the
Dilemmas of Liberalism, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 599, 602-04 (1979).
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